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Abstract— The relevance of cross border security operations 
has been identified as a priority at European level for a long time. 
A European network where Public Protection and Disaster Relief 
(PPDR) forces share communications processes and a legal 
framework would greatly enforce response to disaster recovery 
and security against crime. Nevertheless, uncertainty on costs, 
timescale and functionalities have slowed down the 
interconnection of PPDR networks across countries and limited 
the transnational cooperation of their PPDR forces so far. In this 
context, the European research project ISITEP is aimed at 
developing the legal, operational and technical framework to 
achieve a cost effective solution for PPDR interoperability across 
European countries. Inter alia, ISITEP project is specifying a 
new Inter-System-Interface (ISI) interface for the 
interconnection of current TETRA and TETRAPOL networks 
that can be deployed over Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity. 
This approach turns communications security as a central aspect 
to consider when deploying the new IP ISI protocol between 
PPDR national networks. Ensuring that threats to the 
interconnected communications systems and terminals are 
sufficiently and appropriately reduced by technical, procedural 
and environmental countermeasures is vital to realise the trusted 
and secure communication system needed for the pursued PPDR 
transnational cooperation activities. In this context, this paper 
describes the framework and methodology defined to carry out 
the development of the security requirements and provides a 
discussion on the undertaken security risk and vulnerability 
analysis. 
Keywords— Inter-System Interconnection; TETRA; 
TETRAPOL; Public Safety Communications; Emergency 
Services Communications; Threat, Risk, Vulnerability Analysis; 
Security Requirements 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR) sector 
brings essential value to society by creating a stable and 
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Fig. 2. ISITEP system overview for the development of security 
requirements 
In addition to supporting the migration of legacy TETRA 
and TETRAPOL terminals, ISITEP is defining an enhanced 
user terminal that consists of a programmable platform (a 
smartphone or a Tablet PC) with both TETRA and 
TETRAPOL modems. ISITEP enhanced terminals are 
expected to rely on a terminal control interface (e.g. PEI for 
TETRA and PEI-equivalent for TETRAPOL) in order to 
interconnect the TETRA/TETRAPOL communication 
modem(s) with the programmable device that host the 
applications. As such, security features may also be required 
to protect such a control interface. ISITEP terminals might 
also embed a Security Manager to configure existing security 
parameters according to counterparts and the associated 
security capability. Additional elements of the 
TETRA/TETRAPOL systems that are relevant for the security 
analysis are the elements used to manage the network security 
keys and the elements used to configure/program terminals.  
ISITEP players considered for the analysis of security 
threats and requirements are those already present in PPDR 
TETRA and TETRAPOL systems (e.g., PPDR network 
operators, terminal and system manufacturers, PPDR 
personnel) plus the ones resulting from the specifics of cross-
border, multinational PPDR operations and the use of 
international connectivity services across nation PPDR 
networks (e.g., transport or transit services carrier). In 
addition, a player intruder is considered, which is the role of a 
party who attempts to breach the confidentiality, integrity or 
availability of the communication services, or who otherwise 
attempts to abuse the system in order to compromise services 
or defraud users, home environments, serving networks or any 
other party. An intruder may, for example, attempt to 
eavesdrop on user traffic, signalling data and/or control data, 
or attempt to masquerade as a legitimate party in the use, 
provision or management of communication services. 
III. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY USED FOR 
SECURITY RISK AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
The methodology adopted for the security risk and 
vulnerability analysis of the ISITEP solution is in line with the 
main guidelines provided in ETSI Technical Report ETR 332 
[7] for security requirements capture. After the formulation of 
general objectives and identification of the system 
components, a threat analysis is conducted. A security threat is 
defined as a potential violation of security. While it is possible 
to classify security threats in many different ways (e.g., ITU-T 
Recommendation X.805, 3GPP TR 33.805), the categorisation 
followed in ISITEP is structured around the central functions 
enabled by the ISITEP solution (i.e., roaming support, service 
interworking across the national networks and use of bi-
technology ISITEP terminals), yielding to the 10 threat 
categories described in Table I.  
TABLE I.  THREAT CATEGORIES CONSIDERED IN THE ASSESSMENT 
Threat category Comment 
Threats on visiting users 
authentication 
Threats associated with the use of current 
PPDR network security features with 
roaming terminals Threats on air interface 
encryption 
Threats on the use of 
disable/enable functionality 
Threats on the use of end-to-
end encryption 
Threats from the 
interconnection infrastructure 
to a national infrastructure 
Threats associated with the use of third-
party international interconnection links 
between national PPDR networks 
Threats from mismatching 
security requirements 
between roaming terminals 
and visited networks 
Threats associated with the use of 
terminals in visited networks that may not 
be subject to the same security standards 
Threats from the 
interconnected networks 
Threats associated to the exposure of 
network services and features through the 
ISI interface that can be threated from 
other interconnected national networks if 
those are compromised. 
Threats from exposed 
interfaces within ISITEP bi-
technology terminals 
Threats associated with the use of 
wireless interfaces for the implementation 
of the bi-technology ISITEP terminals 
Threats concerning PPDR 
users’ data privacy 
Threats associated with privacy of data 
exchanges in the communications or 
gathered/collected in networks. A 
distinction is done between privacy of the 
end-users (i.e. first responders) and 
privacy of citizens who may be the subject 
of the communication over the PPDR 
communication system.  
Threats concerning citizens’ 
data privacy 
 
For each threat category, the potential threats and the kind 
of attacks that are possible to realise the threat have been 
addressed. Considered threats belong to one of the following 
groups [8]: Interception/Eavesdropping; Masquerade 
("spoofing"); Loss or corruption of information; Unauthorized 
access; Forgery; Repudiation; and Denial of service (DoS). 
After the identification of the threats, a qualitative risk 
assessment has been conducted and security gaps identified. 
The risk assessment has ended up with a priority list, of the 
identified threats or group of threats, stating which ones are to 
be considered more severe, more important or more costly 
than others. Finally, security requirements have been 
formulated based on the results of the risk assessment for each 
of the threat categories in Table I.  
IV. THREATS ASSESSMENT FROM INTERCONNECTION 
INFRASTRUCTURES AND INTERCONNECTED NETWORKS  
A. Threats from the interconnection infrastructure 
The TETRA/TETRAPOL standards do not address the 
security risks introduced by the interconnection of TETRA or 
TETRAPOL networks using an open IP interconnection 
infrastructure. To identify the new threats associated with the 
deployment of the IP ISI  a differentiation can be made 
between (see Figure 3): (1) Network layer threats targeted at 
the PPDR network and/or SEG; (2) Network layer threats 
targeted at the interconnection infrastructure; (3) Application 
layer threats originating from a legitimate interconnected 
TETRA network (application layer in this context should be 
seen as threats targeted at the signalling used by 
interconnected PPDR networks); (4) and Application layer 
threats originating from a rogue (simulated) PPDR network. 
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Network B, unauthorized deletion/corruption of 
data/loggings stored on the SEG from Network B, 
manipulation (e.g., deletion) of security associations from 
(compromised) trusted peer SEG, resource overload of the 
SEG. Also includes influencing routing of application 
layer signalling at the SEG, preventing correct behaviour 
and thus impacting services, and unauthorized access to 
internal network services within the trusted zone of 
Network A via the SEG (e.g., access to file systems, 
databases, access to network remote 
administration/management services, etc.). 
 [T11] DoS / Manipulation as a result of a non-legitimate 
use of ISI interface signalling by internal intruders /users 
from a remote PPDR network. This includes the 
establishment/manipulation/termination of voice, 
supplementary and data services (SDS, Status) (e.g., 
flooding of the ISI and the Network A by a huge amount 
of SDS messages that are send across the ISI from 
Network B), manipulation of mobility management 
signalling (e.g., fake registration signalling) and disabling 
of ISITEP terminals by fake disabling messages from 
interconnected TETRA or TETRAPOL network. Also 
includes DoS attack by overloading authentication service 
and/or signalling capacity of the ISI gateway with fake 
migration/authentication requests from the remote PPDR 
network, influencing (existing) calls by spoofing 
‘emergency calls’ (emergency calls have a higher priority 
and may therefore influence existing (or new) calls that 
are/will be established over the ISI and unspecified 
behaviour by the ISI gateway by non-specified ISI 
packets sent from the interconnected Network B towards 
the ISI gateway of Network A. 
 [T12] DoS / Manipulation as a result of a non-legitimate 
use of ISI interface signalling originated by external 
intruders / attackers from a remote PPDR network. This 
includes the establishment/manipulation/termination of 
voice, supplementary and data services (SDS, Status) to 
terminals connected in the PPDR Network A from 
external attackers in the remote interconnected PPDR 
Network B. Also includes DoS by overloading 
authentication service and/or signalling capacity of the ISI 
gateway with fake migration/authentication requests from 
malicious mobile stations attached to the remote PPDR 
network and unauthorized (unnecessary) activation of 
international call groups from the interconnected network 
by using a malicious mobile station in the interconnected 
Network B. 
V. RISK ANALYSIS AND REQUIREMENTS 
Based on the framework provided in [9], the 
occurrence/likelihood and impact of the above identified 
threats have been qualitatively assessed, leading to the 
classification provided in Table II. The occurrence likelihood 
of a threat is estimated as Unlikely (U), Possible (P), and 
Likely (L). On the other hand, the impact of a threat is 
estimated as: Low (L) impact, Medium (M) impact, and High 
(H) impact. The combination of occurrence likelihood and 
impact value gives the risk that serves as a measurement for 
the risk that the concerned management function is 
compromised. Three risk categories are distinguished: Minor 
(Mi) risk, Major (Ma) risk, and Critical (C) risk. Minor risks 
arise, if either no essential assets are concerned, or the 
respective attack is unlikely. Major risks are represented by 
threats on relevant assets that are likely to occur, even if their 
impact is less fatal. Critical risks arise when the primary 
interests of the providers/subscribers are threatened and when 
a potential attacker's effort to harm these interests is not high. 
TABLE II.  RESULTS OF THE RISK ANALYSIS AND SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED PER THREAT 
Treat(s) Occurrence Impact Risk Requirements 
T1 P H C R1,R2 
T2 P M Ma R2 
T3 L H C R2, R5, R7 
T4 L H C R2, R3, R4, R5 
T5 L M C R6 
T6 L M C R6, R8 
T7 L M C R5, R7 
T8 L H C R8, R9 
T9 U M Mi R8, R9, R10 
T10 U H Mi R11, R12, R13, R14, 
R15, R16, R17, R18 
T11 U H Mi R15, R16, R17, R18, 
R19 
T12 P M Ma R15, R16, R19, R20, 
R21, R22 
 
The following requirements have been established: 
 R1. Minimum security requirements on the IP 
interconnection service shall be established.  
 R2. ISI control and data plane flows between the two 
interconnection points in each national network shall be 
protected from violation of confidentiality, violation of 
integrity and unauthorised access from the 
interconnection infrastructure. The protection of the 
interconnection link should make use of encryption 
devices at both ends.  
 R3. PPDR operator's interconnection points must offer the 
possibility to filter incoming traffic based on pre-defined 
policies which guarantees that only legitimate traffic is 
forwarded to the SwMI. 
 R4. It shall be possible to statically and dynamically 
control which other PPDR operators can access one 
PPDR operator's network interconnection point.  
 R5. The SEG should be able to send alarms to the PPDR 
operator in case there is a security incident. 
 R6. The key management of the encryption devices shall 
be secure. This is under the responsibility of the operators 
of the two interconnected networks.  
 R7. PPDR operator's interconnection points must offer 
protection against (D)DoS attacks (e.g. attacks coming 
from unknown/untrusted sources, volume-based attacks), 
discarding the packets.  
 R8. PPDR operator’s network interconnection points shall 
have recovery mechanisms so that interconnection link 
can be restored in a timely fashion after any attacks or 
security issues. 
 R9. Stripping/hardening security features shall be 
implemented in SEG.  
 R10. Access to internal interfaces and management 
services on the SEG shall be protected within the PPDR 
network. 
 R11. PPDR operator's interconnection points must offer 
protection against (D)DoS attacks from (compromised) 
interconnected networks (e.g. attacks coming from 
unknown/untrusted sources, volume-based attacks), 
discarding the packets.  
 R12. It shall be possible to statically and dynamically 
control which other PPDR operators can access one 
PPDR operator's network interconnection point.  
 R13. PPDR operator’s network interconnection points 
shall have recovery mechanisms so that interconnection 
link can be restored in a timely fashion after any attacks 
or security issues.  
 R14. PPDR operator's interconnection points must offer 
the possibility to filter incoming traffic based on pre-
defined policies which guarantees that only legitimate 
traffic is forwarded to the SwMI.  
 R15. PPDR operator’s interconnection points must offer 
the ability to monitor and filter traffic (network and 
application data) received from interconnected PPDR 
networks, and identify suspicious/abnormal traffic that 
may lead to e.g. DoS. 
 R16. PPDR operator’s interconnection points must offer 
the ability to report on the effectiveness of the security 
measures taken by the SEG and/ or ISI Gateway (e.g. # of 
detected incidents, response time after detection of 
abnormal traffic, send alarms to the PPDR operator in 
case there is a security incident, etc.).  
 R17. PPDR network operators should agree upon and 
establish (proportional) (multi-lateral / bilateral) security 
policies / procedures to be enforced in their networks. 
Validation / Assurance means that agreed security policies 
/ procedures are applied in the interconnected network 
should be in place.  
 R18.  Minimum security assurance specifications and 
security certifications of the interconnection components 
to be deployed (SEGs, ISI Gateways) should be agreed 
and enforced by network operators.  
 R19. Upon the detection of a security attack through ISI 
services, it should be possible for the operator to turn 
down ISI services in a quick and controlled manner. A 
procedure for risk evaluation and deactivation of ISI 
connectivity should be established among PPDR 
operators and PPDR agencies. 
 R20. The management and protection of the 
authentication process against DoS attacks in a PPDR 
network (e.g., overloading of the authentication server 
with multiple requests from spoof terminals) shall also 
consider counter measures to avoid overloading the 
remote ISI gateway and SwMI in case of authentication 
requests involving migrated terminals. 
 R21. Access to ISI services (e.g., group services, SDS 
services) should be controlled by every serving network 
through the proper management of user service rights. 
Pre-defining rights of visiting users shall be allowed. 
 R22. Features and procedures to track stolen / lost 
terminals and disabling them when migrated in a visited 
network shall be supported  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Communications security is a central aspect of the ISITEP 
framework for inter-system interoperability between TETRA 
and TETRAPOL networks. Ensuring that threats to the 
interconnected communications systems and terminals are 
sufficiently and appropriately reduced by technical, procedural 
and environmental countermeasures is vital to realise the 
trusted and secure communication system needed for the 
pursued PPDR transnational cooperation activities. 
This paper has provided an overview of the security risk 
and vulnerability analysis associated with the new functions 
brought by the ISITEP system. The assessment has focused on 
those security threats that are relevant to the new 
communications capabilities in terms of service interworking 
across multiple national networks and terminal roaming. 
The security requirements described in this paper are being 
considered as an input for the development of other 
components of the ISITEP project. In particular, security 
requirements impact on the definition of the secure network 
solution to national security infrastructure at PPDR national 
network, the definition of procedures for new national network 
interconnections and for roaming activation, and guiding the 
security at network interface, gateway and terminal level. 
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